One of the constitutive elements of the neoliberal societal program, as it has prevailed since the 1970s, is the "consistent expansion of economic forms into the social realm" (Lemke et al. 2000: p. 16). Such economisation of the social means that governmental actions and societal structures are increasingly determined by economic calculations and market principles. In this process, the government itself becomes a kind of enterprise, tasked with universalising competition and inventing market-like systems of action for individuals, groups, and institutions (cf. Lemke et al. 2000). Market formalism extends even to the constructions of individual subjectivity. Bröckling (2007) describes the ideal-typical subject and guiding principle of the neoliberal societal program as the "entrepreneurial self" – individuals become self-entrepreneurs who must adapt flexibly and unconditionally to the constantly changing profit-oriented demands of the market. These demands on individuals for more entrepreneurial initiative, flexibility, and self-responsibility have been accompanied by the promise to protect people from social decline, income loss, and asset depreciation.

Attitudes corresponding to these neoliberal appeals to the market-oriented paradigm have long been widespread in Germany, as existing analyses of market extremism show (Groß/Hövermann 2014; Hövermann/Groß/Zick 2015; Groß/Hövermann 2015; Groß/Hövermann 2016).  At the time, these attitudes were surveyed; more than half of the respondents were in favor of these market-based values (see Groß/Hövermann 2014, p. 107).

Today, in times of mutually reinforcing multiple crises and growing insecurity (e.g., Heitmeyer 2018; Frankenberg & Heitmeyer 2022), the social contract of the neoliberal program and its guiding principles reach their limits. The entrepreneurial self crumbles as a guideline for individual action. Approval of entrepreneurial universalism – attitudes in the form of self-marketing and self-optimisation– has declined significantly since 2014, as we have empirically shown in the current Mitte-Study for the German residential population. Based on the available measurements, in 2014, 59 percent of respondents could still be identified as self-entrepreneurs, and in 2016, 65 percent; by 2023, this proportion had dropped to 35 percent of the German population. However, more than a third of respondents still share the norm of entrepreneurial universalism.

Parallel to the described decline, these neoliberal guiding principles today have a democracy-eroding effect, especially when they coincide with subjective insecurity resulting from current poly-crises. This leads individuals from the middle of society to drift increasingly towards authoritarian and illiberal positions, as shown below.

The entrepreneurial self in crisis - driver of group-focused enmity

Against the backdrop of multiple societal crisis, (social) security cannot be guaranteed even for those who have adapted to entrepreneurial guiding principles. Crisis-burdened individuals who identify with neoliberal guiding principles – i.e., entrepreneurial, (perceived) free, self-responsible, flexible, individualistic, and performance-oriented – react to these increased insecurities with resentment, shame, and grievance (Amlinger & Nachtwey 2022). In (post-)modern societies, this resentment arises from unfulfilled expectations of prosperity and advancement (Neckel 2021). For those who feel marginalised and frustrated in their claims, long-lasting resentment can create a politically  explosive mixture of humiliation and aggression (ibid.).

Resentment and grievances grew, not least during the COVID-19 pandemic, due to repeated lockdowns, often perceived as massive curtailment of free self-development, a cornerstone of the entrepreneurial identity. However, these feelings have already taken shape earlier, for example, through increasing experiences of threatened securities, such as job loss through privatisation, social decline, status loss, and other biographical ruptures that can also be described as "disruptive incisions" (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022: p. 201).

Aggressiveness arises from resentments, grievances, frustrations, and paradoxical experiences of dependence. However, aggression cannot be directed directly against the neoliberal society which fails to deliver on its promises because identification with its neoliberal guiding principles and fear of humiliation are too great (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022). In this regard, strangers can serve as surrogate objects of aggression and rejection.  This particularly affects minority groups that supposedly do not conform to the norms of the entrepreneurial success and meritocratic society. For example, personified as refugees.

 According to our thesis, a dangerous anti-democratic mixture of subjective subjugation to individualistic, competitive appeals of the entrepreneurial self and a destabilising insecurity is forming. As current data show, the combination of market-oriented attitudes with simultaneously perceived insecurity currently affects about 19 percent of the German population. We refer to this group as "Unsecured Market Conformists" (for details of the empirical analysis, see Groß/Hövermann/Nickel 2023). This group stands out with particularly high values regarding group-focused enmity, new-right orientations, acceptance of violence, AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) voting intentions, and right-wing extremist worldviews (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Agreement with new-right orientations, acceptance of violence, AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) voting intentions, group-focused enmity (GMF), and right-wing extremist worldviews in the four groups (percentages); the lines drawn horizontally to the pillars show, for comparison, the average proportion of agreement among all respondents on the respective scales. Example of reading: 40% of the deregulated market conformists share new-right orientations, while this is the case for 7% of the secure non-market conformists. Among all respondents, it is 19%.

It can be assumed that deregulated market conformity has highly problematic consequences not only for minority groups but also for liberal democracy with its institutions and representatives. We refer here to the descriptions of "libertarian authoritarianism" by Amlinger and Nachtwey (2022: p. 171 ff.).
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Libertarian authoritarianism

In libertarian authoritarianism, not only does the devaluation of others function as a crisis mode of the unsecured  market-oriented subject, but there is also a turning away from established democratic parties. In the name of entrepreneurial norms and values (self-realisation, self-responsibility, self-determination), rebellion is waged against the central institutions of society that produced them. Libertarian authoritarianism is fuelled by this contradictory unity of identification with the values and norms of neoliberal society and subversion (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022: p. 174).

Identification with external authorities, including established democratic parties, ends  because this external world is frustrating, not least by the current poly-crises (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022: p. 182). A "generalised mistrust" develops, which applies to almost all established political and social institutions (ibid.: p. 328). These established institutions then represent an "inaccessible authority radically alienated from the citizens" (ibid.: p. 328), which is difficult for offended and resentful self-entrepreneurs to endure. Instead, libertarian authoritarians set themselves up as sovereign subjects, as the only alternative authority whose (entrepreneurial) freedom must not be curtailed under any circumstances.

Experienced (external) dependencies leading to humiliation can thus be ignored. "In this respect, the libertarian manifestation of the authoritarian character can also be understood as a relationship of demonstrative aloofness," as Amlinger and Nachtwey put it (2022: p. 183). "Freedom" then becomes an "insistence on an individual claim to negative freedom" (ibid.: p. 172) and thereby unfolds a destructive potential. This kind of freedom joyfully provokes and is driven by resentful, vengeful reactions against those deemed responsible for one's own suffering and humiliation (ibid.). Freedom, in the libertarian authoritarian imagination, is then no longer an inclusive social mode but a disintegrative individual possession (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022). It is a commodified freedom – "a freedom to consume, to experience, to invest… a raw negative (economic) freedom positioned against inhibiting state or societal authorities" (ibid.: p. 177).

Such negative notions of freedom, along with group-focused enmity, conspiracy beliefs, and disrespect for democracy, fuel offended self-entrepreneurs in the crisis of the present. Amlinger & Nachtwey (2022: p. 205) speak of "emotionally charged struggles for private freedom," particularly in times of crisis when individual leeway is curtailed by the state. The lockdowns during the COVID-19 crisis are a prime example of this and are likely to have accelerated the readiness of libertarian authoritarians to protest.

The hostile, aggressive devaluation of other positions and of those who, in their view, disregard the individual right to negative freedom is characteristic to the authoritarian character. The group of unsecure market conformists that we empirically tracked comes very close to such a libertarian-authoritarian milieu. As is clearly shown in Figure 2 by the significantly increased agreement with authoritarianism and distrust in media and politics, as well as conspiracy thinking in this group.
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Figure 2: Agreement with various dimensions of libertarian-authoritarian attitudes in the four groups based on insecurity and market conformity (percentages); for comparison across the four groups, the horizontal lines indicate the average proportion of agreement among all respondents on the respective scales. Example of reading: 76% of the unsecured market conformists share authoritarian attitudes, while this is the case for 43% of the secure non-market conformists. Among all respondents, it is 58%.

Taken together, the findings paint a clear picture of particularly high agreement with the focused libertarian-authoritarian attitudes among unsecured market conformists. Empirically, there is significant overlap between the unsecured market conformists and libertarian authoritarian beliefs, thus confirming our theoretical assumptions.
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Deregulated market conformity as a driver of libertarian authoritarianism and a threat to democracy

The data analysed here reveal considerable resentment towards higher authorities. Additionally, the analyses show how the anger of libertarian authoritarians is projected onto minority groups (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022: p. 178). Libertarian authoritarians, in the sense of negative freedom, feel only obligated to themselves; that is what defines libertarianism. They have shed binding social norms or internalised considerations for others, such as solidarity, and instead focus on external threats to their individual realms of self-realisation. That this aspect also overlaps with the unsecured market conformists is evident in the widespread devaluation of and de-solidarisation with minority groups within this group. 

Thus, libertarian authoritarians are "only adapted insofar as they have internalised the norms of competitive society" (Amlinger/Nachtwey 2022: p. 178). The aggressive disinhibition of libertarian authoritarianism can also be understood through the identification with the norms of competitive society, that are part of entrepreneurial appeals. The extent of disinhibition and aggression is evident in the fact that almost one in three of the group of unsecured market conformists agrees with the statement "some politicians deserve it if anger against them turns into violence." The characteristics of the libertarian-authoritarian milieu described here, which we empirically traced in the form of unsecured market conformity, in combination with the significantly above-average levels of right-wing extremist attitudes, group-focused enmity, conspiracy thinking, anti-establishment attitudes, new-right orientations, acceptance of violence, and AfD voting intentions, pose a significant threat to liberal-democratic societies. After all, the group of unsecured market conformists described here currently constitutes almost 20 percent of the German population. While this group largely consists of individuals in precarious and disadvantaged circumstances, it is by no means exclusive to them. Unsecured market conformity as a driver of libertarian authoritarianism is also present in the middle classes of society.

To ensure participation, social recognition, and integration for members of (vulnerable) minority groups even in times of fundamental (socio-ecological) transformation, adjustments to the societal value foundation are necessary. Neoliberal models, which promise social recognition through competition, efficiency, flexibility, and success enhancement, are becoming fragile. Since 2014, they have lost significant support among the German population and, in combination with insecurity, are now undermining democracy and promoting hostility towards vulnerable social groups. . Alternative models that enable recognition and participation through cooperation and solidarity, rather than competition and elbow mentality, could also serve as a guiding principle for social action – only then can the urgently needed socio-ecological transformation be supported by everyone, for everyone.

The present article is based on the chapter "Unrestrained Marketisation as a Driver of Libertarian Authoritarianism" in the current Mitte-Study. Further and more detailed empirical explanations can be found there. The Mitte-Study is conducted every two years by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in cooperation with the Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research (IKG). It is a representative attitude study that examines right-wing extremist and democracy-threatening attitudes in German society. In the current edition "The Distanced Middle," published in September 2023, our contribution on 'Unrestrained Marketisation' appeared, which serves as the basis for the present contribution (Groß/Hövermann/Nickel 2023). The database consists of 2,027 individuals who participated in the representative telephone survey of the German residential population between January 2nd and February 28th, 2023.

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Disclaimer: This article is a translated version of the intervention that was originally published in German language as part of the Economists For Future Debate Series in the online magazine Makronom. Hence, some of the linked references are in German. 

About the authors:

Eva Groß is a professor of criminology and sociology at the University of Applied Sciences at the Hamburg Police. Her research focuses on group-focused enmity, hate crime, victimisation/dark field, (online) radicalisation, police, crime perceptions, economisation of the social, and institutional anomie.

Andreas Hövermann studied and earned his doctorate at the University of Bielefeld and worked between 2010 and 2017 at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence. Subsequently, he conducted research as a DFG research fellow at the State University of New York in Albany (USA). Since 2020, he is working at the Economic and Social Science Institute of the Hans-Böckler Foundation on social living conditions, working conditions, and anti-democratic attitudes. His research focuses on anomie, group-based hostility, and social inequality.

Amelie Nickel (M.A.) is a sociologist and research assistant at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence (IKG). She is doing her PhD at the Leibniz ScienceCampus "SOEP-RegioHub" on the political and social consequences of institutional and cultural economisation. In addition to quantitative methods, her research interests include anomie, prejudice, and discrimination, as well as comparative political science research.