The discussion about the future of democracy has become clouded – even in the traditionally democracy-optimistic left-liberal camp. While progressives used to debate how representative democracy could be improved to allow more participation and freedom, the political discourse is increasingly marked by a skeptical tone towards democracy. This skepticism pertains to both the output dimension of democracy (the quality of handling public affairs) and its input side (the quality of civic participation). There is a growing impression that democracies perform poorly in both dimensions compared to what was assumed for a long time (Blühdorn 2020).

Contributing to this is that the rise of right-wing populism is causing unease in the progressive milieu, if not outright fear. There is a concern that right-wing populism does not lead to an "illiberal democracy" but to fascism (Mason 2022). As a result, the question arises as to whether freedom can still be saved if citizens are given a free choice in elections. Doubts about the "legitimacy through procedure" (Luhmann 1983) are growing. The democratic creed includes the following principle: Whoever comes to office through democratic procedures and does not pursue a program of system overthrow deserves obedience. However, this principle is not only questioned by some populists – it also no longer seems self-evident to every progressive.
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Fear of Climate Collapse

In the context of a climate movement resorting to civil disobedience and visibly tangible climate consequences in everyday life, the urgency in the climate policy discussion is increasing. However, a growing number of activists doubt that democratic politics can protect us from climate collapse. They see it not as a solution but as part of the problem since it does not put the necessary measures into practice (Abadi 2022).

Therefore, considerations are now being made on how democratic decision-making processes could be bypassed or even suspended through the introduction of undemocratic institutions, such as a climate authority modeled after "independent" central banks (Schaible 2023). In the academic debate, even authors who consider themselves progressive advocate concepts that imply a "protective technocracy" (Staab 2022) or an ecologically justified state of emergency (Mittiga 2022) involving a far-reaching reduction in democratic participation and political freedom.

In short, skepticism about democracy is growing within the self-proclaimed progressive camp. It feeds on the suspicion that an increasing part of the electorate is voting wrong. Moreover, democracy is seen as incapable of meeting the necessary task of ecological transformation. Against this backdrop, the hasty and optimistically symbol-laden introduction of "citizens' councils" and the relentless praise of democracy should not obscure the fact that skepticism about democracy is also increasing among those who ostensibly act as its representatives and advocates.

Is Democracy Still Future-Proof?

Skepticism about the future viability of democracy is not only due to ideological polarization, academic arrogance, or the fear of a climate catastrophe. It is realistic, albeit for reasons other than those mentioned at the beginning. A look at the changes in the framework of democratic politics makes this clear (Selk 2023):

Firstly, political life has become more complicated due to international interdependence and Europeanization. Politics now takes place on multiple political levels, involving numerous political actors and in the form of policy networks and governance arrangements that are largely incomprehensible to outsiders.

This over-differentiation makes coherent governance difficult, it undermines claims to civic participation, and it leaves observers unfamiliar with the respective subject matter perplexed. In Europe, this is accompanied by the constitutionalization of liberal economic and financial policies and the overstretching of the political space (Jörke 2019). Under such conditions, the yardstick for the legitimacy of political rule increasingly becomes the lifeworld perception of the regime's performance and its media-mediated representation in public. Although governance may still look relatively good in a system comparison, dissatisfaction with the output of the political system is growing. To exaggerate, the guiding question of a post-democratically dominated citizen is: Am I being governed in a way that benefits me?

Secondly, we are witnessing the abandonment of the political-economic regime through which democracies of our mold could generate a high degree of output legitimacy: "democratic capitalism." This refers to a political economy perceived as combining profit-making, growth, and "market justice" with solidarity, redistribution, and "social justice." This perception has collided with reality for some time now (Streeck 2021).

This has political consequences. For many citizens, future prospects are deteriorating (Przeworski 2020), and their assessment of the recent past is negative. But even independently of this changed perception, there are signs that "democratic capitalism" is coming to an end. This is not only due to economic and technological reasons (Collins 2013; Gordon 2016) but also political ones. There is a lack of the discipline of the upper classes and elite control (McCormick 2023) necessary for "democratic capitalism," i.e., the containment of the power aspirations of elites, as well as trade union organization and the social opening of career paths (Hartmann 2013).

It is therefore not surprising that the two most important political theories justifying "democratic capitalism" have become anachronistic. Both social democratic theory, which placed greater emphasis on social justice and state control, and neoliberal theory, which primarily aimed at market efficiency and bureaucratic administration of competition, are no longer suitable for justification. They appear stale and are historically outdated (Offe 2012).

Political economy is, at least regarding its public justification, theory-less. It appears as a game in which the "winners" allied with the elites compete against the "losers" – under unfair conditions. Consequently, something is fading away, which can be described with a term coined by Richard Rorty as "social hope" and which formed the social glue of democratic communities: the belief in jointly steering towards a better future.

Thirdly, transformation stress and adaptation pressure are increasing. Regarding the so-called climate crisis, it is no longer about preventing climate change but about how to deal with it. What this means concretely in political terms is unclear. Many predictions about expected climate consequences and possible solution models for an ecological transformation of society are based on observations, assumptions, models, and theories discussed and critically reviewed by a few experts. However, the majority of citizens cannot understand these in content. Therefore, they have only the choice between trusting the generated knowledge or not believing.

It is inevitable that scientific expertise and forecasts are controversial in such a far-reaching political endeavor. This reflects fundamental conflicts over agenda-setting, priority-setting, and cost distribution. This is particularly the case when problem definitions and solution proposals are presented in an expertocratic mode. While democratic decision-making can be informed by expertise, it is based on the assumption of political equality and the principle that, although not every argument, every vote has the same value. If this principle is replaced by an expertocratic policy justification, especially under conditions of declining output legitimacy, it provokes "democratic resistance" (Selk/Kemmerzell/Radtke 2019).

At the same time, colloquially speaking, the impacts are getting closer: unusually high temperatures, extreme weather events, clear-cutting in local forests. A growing number of people are getting the impression: things really cannot go on like this much longer.

It is therefore questionable whether there will be a convincing answer to the re-emerging social question as well as ecological risks. The changes in the framework of democratic politics and the beginning discursive disassociation from the idea of democracy also make it doubtful whether democracy will have a long future.

Post-Democratic Politics

Of course, there is no shortage of concepts and programmatic ideas on how the two problem areas – socio-political cohesion and ecology – could be addressed simultaneously. The series, in which this article appears, does not skimp on suggestions for shaping socio-ecological transformation. However, the question arises of how such ambitious concepts will make it onto the political agenda and which powerful political actors could stand up for them.

Moreover, it seems that the two issues (socio-political cohesion and ecology) are decoupling in political alignment, namely based on the polarity between two approaches, presented here in a somewhat exaggerated manner: On the one hand, a retrograde populism responding to social disintegration with the forced restoration of the past; on the other hand, a progressive expertocracy that prioritizes ecological transformation over democracy.

The transformation of right-wing populism into a neo-fascist movement is possible but unlikely due to the discrediting of fascism. Rather, there will be a more pronounced development of a retrograde populist profile of restoring the "good old times" and reactivating ideas of the old West German order, as the number of those who think, 'It wasn't all bad (in the good old Bonn Republic),' grows.

In particular, the sharpening of the socio-political profile in the sense of social conservatism can be expected. Some right-wing populist parties, such as the FPÖ, may have a comparatively "green" political profile (on variance Selk/Kemmerzell 2022), but the ecological issue is either relegated to an insignificant place or answered within the framework of a national agenda for "homeland protection." If a left-populist party were to establish itself in Germany, it would either largely ignore the ecological issue or repurpose it as a vehicle to support a communitarian political program. Following the motto: Without the restoration of strong boundaries and community ties, no green politics.

If the disassociation from the idea of democracy among progressives continues as outlined at the beginning, something new might emerge, which can be termed progressive expertocracy.

While expertocracy in Germany has long been used for economically liberal programs, the contours of a marriage between expertocracy and a self-described progressive socio-ecology program are emerging. Due to the status and socialization of its carrier layers, social concerns are relegated to a subordinate position. The primary goal is the accelerated transformation in the sense of an ecologically justified eco-modernism based on the claim of superior knowledge and scenarios of a climate catastrophe. While populism appeals to the "vox populi," the preferred source of legitimacy here is the "vox scientifica" (Zulianello/Ceccobelli 2020).

This approach will not follow the liberal model of ecological modernization (Hajer 2021) because this model was tailored to the political system of pluralistic representative democracy, which is now in dissolution. Progressive expertocracy reacts precisely to this dissolution or is a driver of the evolutionary transformation of the system into something new. In terms of content, it will rely more on a mixture of governmental control, post-democratic governance, redistribution upwards, and expertocratic decision-making, along with illiberal opinion control.

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Disclaimer: This article is a translated version of the intervention that was originally published in German language as part of the Economists For Future Debate Series in the online magazine Makronom. Hence, some of the linked references are in German. 

About the author:

Veith Selk is a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the Technical University of Darmstadt and a Senior Fellow at the Point Alpha Research Institute in Geisa. His research fields include, among others, democratic theory, political theory, and intellectual history. He is involved in the transfer project "Moralization, Emotionalization, Polarization: A Citizen Science Lab for Everyday Experts," funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.